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Abstract— The Encrypted File System (EFS) pushes 
encryption services into the file system itself. EFS 
supports secure storage at the system level through a 
standard UNIX file system interface to encrypted files. 
User can associate a cryptographic key with the 
directories they wish to protect. Files in these directories 
(as well as their pathname components) are 
transparently encrypted and decrypted with the 
specified key without further user intervention; clear 
text is never stored on a disk or sent to a remote file 
server. EFS can use any available file system for its 
underlying storage without modifications, including 
remote file servers such as NFS. System management 
functions, such as file backup, work in a normal manner 
and without knowledge of the key.  Performance is an 
important factor to users since encryption can be time 
consuming. 
This paper describes the design and implementation of 
EFS in user space using faster cryptographic algorithms 
on UNIX Operating system. Implementing EFS in user 
space makes it portable & flexible; Kernel size will also 
not increase resulting in more reliable & efficient 
Operating System. Encryption techniques for file system 
level encryption are described, and general issues of 
cryptographic system interfaces to support routine 
secure computing are discussed. 
Keywords- Advance Encryption standerd, Electronic code book 
mode, EFS daemon, Intialization vector, Network File system. 
   
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Encrypted File System is an interface that ensures the user 
that the data stored on the hard disk is secure and cannot be 
hacked by any other user without the permission of the 
owner. It ensures that the original data doesn’t reside on the 
hard disk in the normal or the plaintext form, but it should 
always been stored in encrypted form which cannot be 
understood by the intruder. As in our current file system, it is 
normally stored in plaintext on the hard disk. So, if someone 
hacks the data stored in hard disk then that person can easily 
access the data. But if the file is stored in an encrypted form 
on the hard disk, the hacking in such cases won’t be so 
effective.  
 
User should not be aware about the location where the 
encryption and decryption takes place. By using encryption 
and decryption methodologies, user can secure his data and 
store it on the hard disk in an unreadable format. Several 
recent incidents accentuate the need for a cohesive solution 
to the problem of storage security that protects data using 
strong cryptographic methods in both personal and 
organizational scenarios. This paper investigates the 
implications of cryptographic protection as a basic feature of 
the file system interface.  
 
II. RELATED WORK 
There are many architectures and procedures available in 
these areas that have already been implemented. Very few of 
them are implemented in user space and most of them are in 
kernel space. Each one of them is having certain advantages 
and limitations. The crucial issues of both, systems level and 
user level cryptography are as mentioned below.  
 
A. ISSUES WITH USER LEVEL CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
The simplest approach for file encryption is available 
through a tool, such as the UNIX crypt program, that 
enciphers (or deciphers) a file or data stream with a specified 
key. Depending on the particular software, the program may 
or may not be automatically delete the clear text while 
encrypting and such programs can usually be used as 
cryptographic "filters" in a command pipeline.  
Another approach is integrated encryption in application 
software, where each program which has to manipulate 
sensitive data has built in cryptographic facilities. For 
example, a text editor could ask for a key when a file is 
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opened and automatically encrypt and decrypt the file’s data 
as they are written and read. All those applications that will 
be operated on the same data must, include the same 
encryption engine. An encryption filter, such as crypt, might 
also be provided to allow data to be imported into and 
exported out of other software.  
Unfortunately, neither approach is entirely satisfactory in 
terms of security, generality or convenience. The former 
approach, which allows great flexibility in its application, 
invites mistakes; the user could inadvertently fail to encrypt a 
file, leaving it in the clear, or could forget to delete the clear 
text version after encryption. The manual nature of the 
encryption and the need to supply the key several times 
whenever a file is used makes encryption too cumbersome. 
More seriously, even when used properly, manual encryption 
programs open a window of vulnerability while the file is in 
clear form. It is almost impossible to avoid occasionally 
storing clear text on the disk and, in the case of remote file 
servers, sending it over the network. Some applications 
simply expect to be able to read and write ordinary files. In 
the application based approach, each program must have 
built in encryption functionality. Although encryption takes 
place automatically, the user still must supply a key to each 
application, typically when it is invoked or when a file is first 
opened. Software without encryption capability cannot 
operate on secure data without the use of a separate 
encryption program, making it hard to avoid all the problems 
outlined in the previous text. Furthermore, rather than being 
confined to a single program, encryption is spread among 
multiple applications, each of which must be trusted to 
interoperate securely and correctly with the others. A single 
poorly designed component can introduce a significant and 
difficult to detect window of vulnerability. Changing the 
encryption algorithm entails modification of every program 
that uses it, creating many opportunities of implementation 
errors. Finally, multiple copies of user level cryptographic 
code can introduce a significant performance penalty. [1]  
 
B. ISSUES WITH SYSTEM LEVEL CRYPTOGRAPHY 
One way to avoid many of the pitfalls of user level 
encryption is to make cryptographic services a basic part of 
the underlying system. In designing such a system, it is 
important to identify exactly what is to be trusted with clear 
text and what requires cryptographic protection i.e. we must 
understand what components of the system are vulnerable to 
compromise.  
For files, we are usually interested in protecting the physical 
media on which sensitive data are stored. This includes 
online disks as well as backup copies, which may persist 
long after the online versions have been deleted. In 
distributed file server based systems, it is often also desirable 
to protect the network connection between client and server 
since these links may be very easy for interception attack [1]. 
Physical media can be protected by specialized hardware. 
Disk controllers are commercially available with embedded 
encryption hardware that can be used to encipher entire disks 
or individual file blocks with a specified key. Once the key 
will be provided to the controller hardware, encryption will 
be completely transparent. This approach has a number of 
limitations for general uses. The granularity of encryption 
keys must be compatible with the hardware; often, the entire 
disk must be thought of as a single protected entity. It is 
difficult to share resources among users who are not willing 
to trust one another with the same key. Obviously, this 
approach is only applicable when the required hardware is 
available.  
Network connections between client machines and file 
servers can be protected with end-to-end encryption. 
Specialized hardware may be employed for this purpose, 
depending on the particular network involved, or it may be 
implemented in software. However, all networks does not 
support encryption and among those that do, all system 
vendors does not supply working implementations of 
encryption as a standard product.[8] 
Even when the various problems with media and network 
level encryption are ignored, the combination of the two 
approaches may not be adequate for the protection of data in 
modern distributed systems. In particular, even though clear 
text may never be stored on a disk or sent "over the wire", 
sensitive data can be leaked if the file server itself is 
compromised. At some point file server must maintain, the 
keys used to encipher both the disk and the network. Even if 
the server can be completely trusted, direct media encryption 
on top of network encryption has a number of shortcomings 
from the point of view of efficient distributed system design 
[2].  
Further, the alternative approach taken by the Encrypted File 
System (EFS) has been mentioned. EFS pushes file 
encryption entirely into the client file system interface, and 
therefore does not suffer from many of the difficulties 
inherent in user level and disk and network based system 
level encryption. 
 
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SERVICES IN THE FILE 
SYSTEM 
The main focus of EFS is to identify the location in a system, 
where file encryption will be performed. If it is at too low 
level, then trusts in components are removed from the user’s 
control. If it is too close to the user, frequent human 
interaction may lead to error.  
A. DESIGN GOALS 
EFS occupy something of a middle ground between low 
level and user level cryptography. It aims to protect exactly 
those aspects of file storage that are vulnerable to attack in a 
way that is convenient enough to use routinely. In particular, 
we will be guided by the following specific goals:  
Key management scheme: The sensitive information of the 
file in encrypted file system is access by the key which is 
taken as the input from the user as a passphrase. This key is 
used to encrypt the content of the file and also help in 
returning the original content of the file. There must be a 
way to get this key from the user. It is taken in the form of 
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passphrase. It is the most crucial input to the encrypted file 
system on which the whole security of the system relies. 
Transparent access semantics: Encrypted files should support 
the same access methods available on the underlying storage 
system. All system calls should work normally, and it should 
be possible to compile and execute in a completely encrypted 
environment. 
Transparent performance: Encryption algorithms are 
computationally intensive, but the overhead should not be 
too high so as to discourage the use of encrypted file system 
in the real scenario. 
Security of file contents: The file contents should be secure 
effectively so that no other person gets to know about the 
data without the knowledge of key, the structural data should 
also be protected e.g.  Information in the header & footer of 
the file should not generate same cipher text. 
Natural key granularity: It should be easy to protect related 
files under the same key, and it should be easy to create new 
keys for other files. The UNIX directory structure is a 
flexible, natural way to group files.  
Compatibility with underlying system services: The files and 
directory generated by the encrypted file system should 
behave normally and should be manageable as the normal 
file in the file system. 
Portability: The encrypted file system should use the 
available functionality and features. The files and directory 
should be seen normally whenever the key is supplied to the 
file system. 
Scalability: The encryption engine should not place an 
unusual load on any shared component of the system. File 
servers in particular should not be required to perform any 
special additional processing for clients who require 
cryptographic protection.  
 
Compatibility with future technologies: Several emerging 
technologies have potential applicability for protecting data. 
In particular, keys could be contained in or managed by 
"smart cards" that would remain in the physical possession of 
authorized users. An encryption system should support, but 
not require, novel hardware of this sort. 
B.  EFS FUNCTIONALITY AND USER INTERFACE 
Encrypted File System interacts with standard UNIX file 
system through system calls and treats all the files in same 
manner, irrespective of file being encrypted or normal file of 
standard file system. It prevents user from entering the same 
key several times. The EFS attaches a key to a directory and 
all the files within that directory are automatically encrypted. 
When this directory is attached to the Encrypted File System 
directory, then all the operations on the file can be executed. 
The files are automatically decrypted when they are read and 
are encrypted when write operation is performed. No 
modifications are required on the file system on which 
encrypted files are stored. 
EFS provides “Virtual File System” on client’s machine 
typically mounted on /crypt, through which user access their 
encrypted files.  All the files are stored in the encrypted form 
and with the encrypted path name in associated directory. 
These files are not visible to the user until they attach the 
associated directory to the /crypt of the EFS. The underlying 
encrypted directories can reside on any accessible file 
system, including remote file servers such as Sun NFS [6]. 
No space is required to be pre-allocated for EFS directories 
and user controls EFS through commands like create, attach, 
detach etc. 
To use Encrypted File System user has to create a directory 
and EFS by issuing command emkdir, with this key associate 
a passphrase i.e. key which is used by EFS to encrypt all the 
files within that directory. The passphrase should be at least 
16 characters long. For instance, it can be “This is Encrypted 
File System”. The emkdir works same as mkdir of DOS, but 
here we have to give passphrase in order to make it secure. 
Eg $ emkdir/user/jas/efs   (name of the encrypted directory) 
(user enters passphrase, which does not echo) (same phrase 
entered again to prevent errors) 
In order to use the files in the directory in the normal form, 
we have to supply key to the EFS. This is achieved by attach 
command. It takes three parameters. 
1. Passphrase 
2. Name of directory created 
3. New name of directory 
$ attach /user/jas/efs aks Key: (same key used in the cmkdir 
command) 
If the key is supplied correctly, the user "sees" /crypt/aks as a 
normal directory; all standard operations (creating, reading, 
writing, compiling, executing, cd, mkdir, etc.) works as 
expected. The actual files are stored under /user/jas/efs, 
which would not ordinarily be used directly. Access to 
attached directories is controlled by restricting the virtual 
directories created under /crypt using the standard UNIX file 
protection mechanism. Only the user who issued the attach 
command is permitted to see or use the clear text files. This 
is based on the uid of the user; an attacker who can obtain 
access to a client machine and compromise a user account 
can use any of that user’s currently attached directories. If 
this is a concern, the attached name can be marked obscure, 
which prevents it from appearing in a listing of /crypt. When 
an attach is made obscure, the attacker must guess its current 
name, which can be randomly chosen by the real user. Of 
course, attackers who can become the "super user" on the 
client machine can thwart any protection scheme, including 
this; such an intruder has access to the entire address space of 
the kernel and can read (or modify) any data anywhere in the 
system. 
In order to remove the directory as files from /crypt we will 
use the command detach which removes the entry from the 
/crypt of EFS. File names are encrypted and encoded in an 
ASCII representation of their binary encrypted value padded 
out to the cipher block of size eight bytes. 
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$ detach aks  
Some data are not protected. File sizes, access times, and the 
structure of the directory hierarchy are all kept in the clear 
text. (Symbolic link pointers are, however, encrypted.) This 
makes EFS vulnerable to traffic analysis from both real time 
observation and snapshots of the underlying files; whether 
this is acceptable must be evaluated for each application.     
IV. FILE ENCRYPTION METHODOLOGY 
EFS use Advance Encryption Standard (AES) [4] to encrypt 
the file data. There are various modes of AES; one of it is 
Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode. [5] In which each eight 
byte block is encrypted individually. The main shortcoming 
of ECB is that it will produce same cipher text for the 
identical plain text block. It will help the cryptanalyst to find 
structural similarity of the data and help to decrypt the text 
easily.  
Other modes of AES are various chaining ciphers. These 
modes help in reducing the shortcoming of ECB mode. It 
helps in overcoming the problem of structural analysis. But 
the problem with this mode is that, the random access of file 
becomes difficult due to reason that all the blocks are 
dependent on the cipher preceding block.  
Since 56 bit key is vulnerable to exhaustive search of the key 
space. To remove this problem we will use multiple AES to 
provide more security to data. To remove both the 
shortcomings of random access and structural analysis, we 
had used both the modes of AES. The 128 bit supplied key is 
crunched into two halves of 56 bit key. Now the first 56 bit is 
used to calculate the long initial block with AES OFB mode. 
Now whenever a file is to be written, it is XOR’ed with the 
initial block and then encrypted by the second key using 
AES with ECB mode. When reading, the cipher is reversed 
in the obvious manner, first decrypt in ECB mode then XOR 
it with initial block.  
This method helps us to overcome both the problems of 
random access and structural analysis. It is clear that the 
protection against attack is at least as strong as a single AES 
pass in ECB mode and may be as strong as two passes with 
AES stream mode cipher. It is likely that the scheme is 
weakened, in such situation the attacker might be able to 
search for the two AES sub keys independently. If there are 
several known plaintext file encrypted with same key. In the 
chaining mode, as far as the Initialization Vector (IV) is 
different, the cipher text of identical block will be different. 
For this purpose we can attach IV to the beginning of file for 
maintaining atomicity. 
Encryption of path name components uses a similar scheme 
with the addition that the higher order bit of clear text name 
are set to a simple checksum computed over the entire name 
string. 
It is important to emphasize that EFS protects data only in 
the context of the file system. It is not, in itself, a complete, 
general purpose cryptographic security system. Once bits 
have been returned to a user program, they are beyond the 
reach of EFS’s protection. This means that even with EFS, 
sensitive data might be written to a paging device when a 
program is swapped out or revealed in a trace of a program’s 
address space. Systems where the paging device is on a 
remote file system are especially vulnerable to this sort of 
attack. (It is theoretically possible to use EFS as a paging file 
system, although the current implementation does not readily 
support this in practice.) .It should also be taken into 
consideration that EFS does not protect the links between 
users and the client machines on which EFS runs; users 
connected via networked terminals remain vulnerable if these 
links are not otherwise secured. 
A. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE 
The EFS prototype has been implemented entirely at user 
level, communicating with the Unix kernel via the NFS 
interface. Each client machine runs a special NFS server, 
efsd (EFS Daemon), on its localhost interface, that interprets 
EFS file system requests. At boot time, the system invokes 
efsd and issues an NFS mount of its localhost interface on 
the EFS directory (/crypt) to start EFS. (To allow the client 
to also work as a regular NFS server, EFS runs on a different 
port number from standard NFS.) The NFS protocol is 
designed for remote file servers, and so assumes that the file 
system is very loosely coupled to the client (even though, in 
EFS’s case, they are actually the same machine)[6]. The 
client kernel communicates with the file system through 
remote procedure calls (RPCs) that implement various file 
system related primitives (read, write, etc.). The server is 
stateless, in that, it is not required to maintain any state data 
between individual client calls. All communication is 
initiated by the client, and the server can simply process each 
RPC as it is received and then wait for the next. Most of the 
complexity of an NFS implementation is in the generic client 
side of the interface, and it is therefore often possible to 
implement new file system services entirely by adding a 
simple NFS server. 
efsd is implemented as an RPC server for an extended 
version of the NFS protocol. Additional RPCs attach, detach, 
and otherwise control encrypted directories. Initially, the root 
of the EFS file system appears as an empty directory. The 
attach command sends an RPC to efsd with arguments 
containing the full path name of a directory, the name of the 
"attach point", and the key. If the key is correct, cfsd 
computes the cryptographic mask (described in the previous 
section) and creates an entry in its root directory under the 
specified attach point name. The attach point entry appears 
as a directory owned by the user who issued the attach 
request, with a protection mode to prevent others from seeing 
its contents.   
Encryption of pathname components uses a similar scheme, 
with the addition that the high order bits of the clear text 
name (which are normally zero) are set to a simple checksum 
computed over the entire name string. This frustrates 
structural analysis of long names that differ only in the last 
few characters. The same method is used to encrypt symbolic 
link pointers. 
For each encrypted file accessed through an attach point, 
efsd generates a unique file handle that is used by the client 
NFS interface to refer to the file. For each attach point, the 
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EFS daemon maintains a table of handles and their 
corresponding underlying encrypted names. When a read or 
write operation occurs, the handle is used as an index into 
this table to find the underlying file name. efsd uses regular 
Unix system calls to read and write the file contents, which 
are encrypted before writing and decrypted after reading, as 
appropriate. To avoid repeated open and close calls, efsd also 
maintains a small cache of file descriptors for files on which 
there have been recent operations. Directory and symbolic 
link operations, such as readdir, readlink, and lookup are 
similarly translated into appropriate system calls and 
encrypted and decrypted as needed. To prevent intruders 
from issuing RPC calls to EFS directly (and thereby 
thwarting the protection mechanism), efsd only accepts 
RPCs that originate from a privileged port on the local 
machine. Responses to the RPCs are also returned only to the 
localhost port, and file handles include a cryptographic 
component selected at attach time to prevent an attacker on a 
different machine from spoofing one side of a transaction 
with the server. 
It is instructive to compare the flow of data under EFS with 
that taken under the standard, unencrypted file system 
interface. Figure 1 shows the architecture of the interfaces 
between an application program and the ordinary Sun "vnode 
based" Unix file system [3]. Each arrow between boxes 
represents data crossing a kernel, hardware, or network 
boundary; the diagram shows that data written from an 
application are first copied to the kernel and then to the (local 
or remote) file system. Figure 2 shows the architecture of the 
user level EFS prototype. Data are copied several extra 
times; from the application, to the kernel, to the EFS 
daemon, back to the kernel, and finally to the underlying file 
system. Since EFS uses user level system calls to 
communicate with the underlying file system, each file is 
cached twice, once by EFS in clear form and once by the 
underlying system in encrypted form. This effectively 
reduces the available file buffer cache space by a factor of 
two.  
The architecture described above helps in analyzing the 
efficiency of the algorithm. To analyze an algorithm is to 
determine the amount of resources (such as time and 
storage) necessary to execute it. Most algorithms are 
designed to work with inputs of arbitrary length. Usually the 
efficiency or complexity of an algorithm is stated as a 
function relating the input length to the number of steps 
(time complexity) or storage locations (space complexity). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Architecture of normal V-node file system in Unix 
 
 
Figure 2: The Architecture of the user level EFS prototype 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore this algorithm has complexity O (n2). Its an 
important issue that while considering algorithms, one often 
measures complexity via the number of comparisons that 
occur, ignoring things such as assignments, etc. It will be 
suitable to keep track of any factors, in particular those 
which proceed with the dominating sub term. In the DES, 
the factor applied to the dominating sub term, namely n2 
was 3/2, and by coincidence, this was also the factor that 
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came with the second term, namely n. It is obvious that an 
algorithm which is linear will perform better than a 
quadratic one, provided the size of the problem is large 
enough, but if it is known that the problem has a size of, say, 
at most 100 then a complexity of (1/10) n2 might be 
preferable to one of 1000000n. 
 
V. RESULTS & PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
After implementing encrypted file system, it has been tried 
to find out the change in the space of file i.e. the variation of 
space of the encrypted file form the original file. For that 
some file of specific size has been taken and encrypted it 
using the encrypted file system. The Table-1 shows the 
variation of size of the original file when encrypted by EFS. 
The variation in size of encrypted file is approximately 2.5 
times the size of the original file. As the encryption 
algorithm is computationally intensive, the computational 
time has been computed for the file of same size with EFS. 
The time taken by EFS to encrypt file of specific size is 
shown in Table-2. The final result is that both the time and 
space of the encrypted graph increase with the increase in 
the size of input file. 
For the purpose of comparison standard utility of UNIX has 
been used i.e. crypt, which is used to encrypt and decrypt 
the file in the UNIX [7]. The same size of input files have 
been taken and the size of output file have been analyzed to 
get the variation in time and space and compared it with the 
time and space variation of encrypted file system. The 
variation in size is shown in Table-3 and the variation in the 
time is shown in the Table-4.   
 
Table-1: Difference in size of original and encrypted file by EFS 
Size Of Original file Size Of Encrypted File 
909 bytes 2.3 KB 
3.6 KB 9.3 KB 
9.5 KB 24.5 KB 
10.7 KB 27.5 KB 
15.6 KB 39.9 KB 
 
Table- 2: Time taken by EFS to encrypt a file 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Variation in size of original file 
 
Figure 4: Variation in time according to size 
 
 
Table -3: Difference in size of original and encrypted file by crypt 
 
Size of Original 
File 
Time Taken By Encrypted 
File System 
909 Bytes 278 ms 
3.6 KB 304 ms 
9.5 KB 358 ms 
10.7 KB 381 ms 
15.6 KB 410 ms 
Size Of original file Size Of Encrypted File By crypt 
909 Bytes 1.6 KB 
3.6 KB 4.5 KB 
9.5 KB 14.5 KB 
10.7 KB 16.3 KB 
15.6 KB 22.5 KB 
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Figure 5: Variation of size of original file by Crypt 
 
 
Table-4: Time taken by Crypt to encrypt a file 
 
 
Size Of Original 
File 
Time Taken By 
crypt To Encrypt 
909 Bytes ≈ 0 ns 
3.6 KB ≈ 0 ns 
9.5 KB 10000  ns 
10.7 KB 10000 ns 
15.6 KB 20000 ns 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
 
The proposed model of EFS provides a simple mechanism 
to protect data written to disks and sent to networked file 
servers. Although experience with proposed model of EFS 
is still limited to the research environment, rather 
performance on modern workstations appears to be within a 
range that allows its routine use. Obviously, it has 
shortcomings of a user-level NFS server based 
implementation. 
The client file system interface appears to be the right place 
to protect file data. If we consider the other alternatives, 
encrypting at the application layer is inconvenient. 
Application based encryption leaves windows of 
vulnerability while files are in the clear or requires the 
exclusive use of special purpose applications on all 
encrypted files. At the disk level, the granularity of 
encryption may not match the user’s security requirements, 
especially if different files are to be encrypted under 
different keys. Encrypting the network in distributed file 
systems, while useful in general against network based 
attack, does not protect the actual media and therefore still 
requires trust in the server not to disclose file data. 
The main focus of EFS is to reduce the barriers that stand in 
the way of the effective and ubiquitous utilization of file 
encryption. This is especially relevant as physical media 
remains exposed to theft and unauthorized access. 
Whenever sensitive data is being handled, it should be the 
modus operandi that the data be encrypted at all times when 
it is not directly being accessed in an authorized manner by 
the applications. It can be implemented on modern operating 
systems without having to change the rest of the system. 
Better performance and stronger security may be achieved 
by running the file system in the kernel. Proposed model of 
EFS is more portable than other kernel based file systems 
because it interacts with a standard vnode interface, as the 
quick ports to Linux. 
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